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(NON)COMPLIANCE WITH AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION PROGRAMS:  
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
 
Abstract - This paper introduces enforcement costs and farmer noncompliance into the economic 
analysis of the USDA conservation program on highly erodible lands. A model of heterogeneous 
producers is developed to determine the economic causes of farmer noncompliance with the provisions of 
the conservation program. In addition, the paper determines the enforcement policy design that can induce 
conservation compliance and examines the effectiveness of the current enforcement policy in deterring 
producer noncompliance. The implications of the theoretical model are tested empirically with data 
provided by USDA. The analysis shows that farmer compliance with the provisions of the conservation 
program is not necessarily the natural outcome of self-interest and complete deterrence of noncompliance 
is not feasible with the current enforcement policy of the government. Both theoretical and empirical 
results indicate that the use of farm program payments as a leverage against noncompliance is not 
sufficient for inducing full producer compliance. Unless the government alters its policy on fines for 
fraudulent behavior, enforcement of conservation compliance will remain imperfect and some degree of 
noncompliance with the provisions of the program on highly erodible lands will continue to persist. 
 
Keywords:   Agricultural conservation programs, conservation compliance, enforcement, highly erodible 
lands. 
 
The 1985 Food Security Act linked farm program payments to the conservation of soil and wetlands 
throughout the United States. The provisions of the Act stipulated that producer eligibility for farm 
program payments required certain on-farm resource conservation activities on highly erodible land 
or/and wetlands converted for agricultural production (Claassen). An implication of this policy was to 
bring the farm commodity programs in line with federal conservation programs, such as the Conservation 
Reserve Program, the Wetland Reserve Program, the Farmland Protection Program and the Wildlife 
Habitat Protection Program, where farmers are compensated through direct payments for conservation 
activities. 
While the link of government payments to conservation activities purports to provide producers/ 
owners of highly erodible land with incentives to adopt (costly) conservation practices, farmer 
compliance with the provisions of the conservation program is by no means assured. Given the increased 
costs associated with the adoption of conservation activities, producers might find it optimal to not apply 
an approved conservation plan yet claim government payments they are not entitled to. And this 
noncompliance is not unknown to program enforcers. Since the inception of the conservation program 
over 11,000 producers have been cited for violations on approximately 281,000 acres with a total of   2 
nearly $16,000,000 in denied benefits (Claassen). Despite the incentives for, and the incidence of, 
noncompliant behavior by conservation program participants, this issue has not been analyzed 
systematically. 
The objective of this paper is to introduce enforcement costs and farmer noncompliance into the 
economic analysis of agricultural conservation programs. Specifically, the paper examines the economic 
causes of farmer noncompliance with the provisions of the USDA conservation program on highly 
erodible lands. In addition, the paper focuses on the role of available policy tools (i.e. farm program 
payments, audits, and penalties) in inducing conservation compliance when enforcement is costly and 
examines the effectiveness of the current enforcement policy design in deterring noncompliance.  
The hypotheses generated from the analytical model are tested empirically with data on costs of 
conservation practices, farmer noncompliance, audits and penalties provided by USDA. Although the 
research focuses on the conservation of highly erodible lands, the results of this study have implications 
for the larger group of conservation programs administered by the USDA. 
While there are a number of studies on enforcement issues related to traditional farm programs 
(such as production quotas, deficiency payments, decoupled payments and export subsidies (Giannakas 
and Fulton 2000a, 2000b; Giannakas)), this paper represents the first attempt to theoretically and 
empirically analyze farmer noncompliance with the provisions of an agricultural program. An additional 
distinct feature of this study is that it relaxes the (conventional) assumption of producer homogeneity 
when analyzing farmer noncompliance with the conservation program. Instead, producers are postulated 
to differ in terms of age, education, experience, management skills, technology adopted, size and location 
of the farm, etc. The heterogeneity of producers in terms of production factors is a key component in the 
model and is critical to understanding the partial producer participation in the conservation program as 
well as non-compliance with program provisions on part (but not all) of the highly erodible land.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model and 
determines (i) the economic causes of producer noncompliance and (ii) the design of the enforcement 
policy that induces producers to comply with the provisions of the conservation program on highly   3 
erodible land. Section 3 examines the effectiveness of the existing enforcement policy in deterring 
producer noncompliance. The implications of the theoretical model are tested empirically in Section 4 
while Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2.   The Producer Problem   
2.1.   Participation in the Program  
As mentioned previously, the introduction of the USDA program on highly erodible lands purports to 
induce producers/owners of highly erodible land to adopt conservation practices when employing this 
land in their production process. To provide producers with incentives to adopt (costly) conservation 
practices, the government has linked participation in the program with individual producer’s eligibility to 
receive farm program payments. Specifically, for a producer to receive government payments 
corresponding to her production activity, she has to develop and submit a plan of action that indicates the 
conservation practices she intends to adopt (apply) on the highly erodible land she owns (Claassen). 
Approval of this plan by the USDA, entitles the producer to government payments associated with her 
farming activity. Of course, implicit in the provisions of the conservation program is a presumption that 
the farmer adopts the conservation practices described in the plan. 
To illustrate the necessity of linking government payments to conservation practices by 
producers/owners of highly erodible land, consider first the case where eligibility for government 
payments is not contingent upon participation in the conservation program. Abstracting initially from the 
compliance issue (i.e., assuming producers adopt conservation practices specified in their approved 
production plan), the producer problem can be seen as the choice of whether to participate in the 
conservation program (by developing and receiving approval for a plan of action) or not.  
As mentioned previously, producers are assumed to be differentiated in some fashion. 
Specifically, farmers are assumed to differ in the relative returns they receive from the use of the highly 
erodible land in the production process, which in turn stems from differences in such things as education,   4 
management skills, geography, etc. Let a denote the attribute that differentiates producers. A producer 
with attribute a has the following net returns function: 
 












NA NA β Π + − =   If does not participate in the program 
 
where p is the farm price of the output produced using the erodible land; 
0
A Q  and 
0
NA Q  are the quantities 
produced by the producer with differentiating attribute a = 0 with and without adoption of conservation 
practices, respectively; while  () Q c
0
A  and  () Q c
0
NA  denote the costs of production for this same producer 
under the two adoption scenarios examined here. The parameters γ  and β  are non-negative return 
premium factors associated with farm production with and without participation in the conservation 
program, respectively, while attribute a takes values between zero and one and captures producer 
heterogeneity in terms of costs of production. The terms γ a and β a give the difference in net returns 
between producers with different values of the attribute a with and without adoption of conservation 
practices, respectively. 
  Figure 1 illustrates the (marginal) costs of production and output choices for producers with 
differentiating attribute a = 0 and a = 1 with and without adoption of conservation practices. The producer 
with a = 0 has higher production costs and, therefore, produces less output than the producer with a = 1 

















NA Q Q < ). A consequence of this is that less efficient producers will find it optimal to set aside 
greater part of their highly erodible land. The difference in returns when the two producers do not adopt 








NA − − − = β ) while the parameter 
γ  gives the difference in returns when both types of producers adopt the conservation practice (i.e., 








A − − − = γ ).   5 
  It is assumed that, while adoption of conservation practices on the highly erodible land increases 
the costs of production for all producers, it increases the production costs of the less efficient producers 
by relatively more. Since the cost of adoption declines with a, the divergence in the net returns arising 
from differences in producer efficiency increases with the adoption of conservation practices, i.e., γ  >β .  
  A producer’s choice of whether to participate in the conservation program or not is determined by 
the relationship between the returns under adoption of conservation practices vis a vis the returns when 
the farmer does not participate. Figure 2 illustrates the decisions of producers. The curve Π NA graphs the 
net returns when farmers do not participate in the program while the curve Π A depicts the net returns 
associated with the adoption of conservation practices for different levels of the differentiating attribute a. 
Since adoption of conservation practices results in increased costs for all producers, the curve Π A lies 
underneath curve Π NA and all farmers will find it optimal not to participate in the program. 
  To induce farmers to participate in the program, the government changed their payoff function by 
linking their eligibility for government payments, GP, to adoption of conservation practices. Assuming 
that farm program payments are a non-decreasing function of the level of production (and, thus, producer 
efficiency) so that GP(a) = GP
0+θ a where θ  ≥  0, the net returns function of the producer with attribute a 
becomes: 
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production practice 
 




NA NA β Π + − =   If does not participate in the program 
 
The introduction of GP into the payoff function of producers increases both the intercept and the slope of 
the Π A curve. The relevant net returns curve is shown as the (dashed) 
'
A Π  curve in Figure 2. Once again, 
the producers’ choice on whether to participate in the conservation program or not depends on the relative 
returns under the two options. Specifically, the intersection of the net return curves 
'
A Π  and Π NA 
determines the level of the differentiating attribute that corresponds to the indifferent producer. The    6 
producer with attribute aNA given by:  
 

















GP ) Q ( c pQ ) Q ( c pQ
a : a  
 
is indifferent between adopting and not adopting conservation practices – the net returns associated with 
the two options are the same. Producers “located” to the left of aNA (i.e., producers with a∈[ 0, aNA)) will 
not participate in the program, while producers “located” to the right of aNA (i.e., producers with a∈ (aNA, 
1]) find it more profitable to adopt the conservation practices. When producers are uniformly distributed 
with respect to their differentiating attribute a, the level of a corresponding to the indifferent consumer, 
aNA, also determines the portion of farmers that decide not to adopt conservation practices, sNA. The 
portion of program participants, sA, is given by 1- aNA.
1  
  Comparative statics results can easily be drawn from this model. More specifically, an increase in 
the cost associated with adoption of conservation practices shifts the 
'
A Π  curve downwards and reduces 
farmer participation in the program, sA, while an increase in the government payments linked to the 
adoption of conservation practices causes an upward shift of the 
'
A Π  curve, increasing sA. Obviously, if 









0 − − − ≥ , all producers will adopt conservation practices (the curve 
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0  no farmer will 
participate in the conservation program (the curve 
'
A Π  lies below Π NA ∀ a). 
  In general, producers will participate in the conservation program on highly erodible lands when 
the government payments linked to program participation are greater than the costs of adopting the 
conservation practices. The greater is the size of government payments, the greater is the number of 
producers that will adopt conservation practices on their highly erodible land.   
                                                 
1 Note that the analysis considers those producers/owners of highly erodible land who find it profitable to farm (i.e., 
their net returns from farming are positive).
 Obviously there might have been farmers for whom the linkage of 
government payments to costly conservation practices resulted in their exit from farming.   7 
2.2.   Compliance with Program Provisions  
Implicit in the previous analysis is the assumption that farmers comply completely with the provisions of 
the program on highly erodible lands, i.e., those developing and receiving approval for a plan of action, 
adopt the conservation practices required. However, given the increased costs associated with the 
adoption of conservation activities, producers might find it optimal to develop (and get approval for) a 
plan of action (so that they receive the government payments) but not actually implement this plan.  
Costly monitoring and enforcement are required to induce producers who develop and receive 
approval for a plan of action, to adhere to the terms of the program and adopt (costly) conservation 
practices. The resource costs of monitoring and enforcement might result in enforcement that is imperfect 
which, in turn, creates economic incentives for noncompliance. Put in a different way, the possibility of 
noncompliance arises from an informational constraint, namely producers’ actions cannot be directly 
observed; they can only be verified through costly auditing. 
Assuming that producers/owners of highly erodible land know the penalty if they are found not 
complying with an approved conservation plan and the probability of being detected, their problem can be 
seen as the determination of whether to participate in the government program by developing (and getting 
approval for) a plan of action and, if so, whether to comply with the provisions of the program and 
implement the approved plan. Assuming neutrality towards risk, the net returns function of the producer 
with attribute a can be re-written as: 
 




A A θ γ Π + + + − =   If develops plan and adopts approved 
production practice  
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NA θ β ρ δ Π + + − + − =   If develops plan but does not adopt 
approved production practice 
 
where δ   is the probability that the producer will be audited (and detected if not complying with the 
conservation program) and ρ   is the penalty in the event of detected noncompliance.    8 
The audit probability takes values between zero and one (i.e., δ ∈ [0, 1]) and is assumed to be a 
function of a base probability δ 0 that is constant across producers, and farm-specific characteristics that 
affect the audit probability (such as the number of variances issued previously) and are captured by the 
differentiating attribute a, i.e., δ   = δ 0 (1+a). Variances are issued when farmers who have developed and 
received approval for their plan of action, have in good faith (i.e., due to adverse weather or production 
conditions for instance) failed to fully implement the approved plan (Claassen). The issuance of a 
variance to a producer implies that this producer will be audited in subsequent time periods (Hyberg). 
Since the likelihood that conservation practices will be adopted increases with a (Figure 2), so does the 
likelihood that variances will be issued.
2 The audit probability δ  is assumed to be a function of the costs 
associated with investigating producers and the resources available to program enforcers for monitoring 
conservation compliance. 
Figure 3 graphs the net returns associated with adoption of conservation practices, Π A, non-
participation in the program, Π NA, and noncompliance with program provisions, 
c
NA Π , for different levels 
of the differentiating attribute a when the level of enforcement is greater than a critical level (δ 0ρ )
+  (i.e., 
δ 0ρ  > (δ 0ρ )
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0 − − − = ∆ ). In this case, 
the Π NA curve lies above the 
c
NA Π  and Π A curves over some range of a making non-participation in the 
program optimal for some producers.  
Specifically, the intersection of Π A and Π NA in Figure 3 determines the level of the differentiating 
attribute that corresponds to the producer who is indifferent between adopting and not adopting the 
conservation practices, aNA, i.e.,  
  
                                                 
2 Given that adoption of conservation practices increases with a and a portion of adopting producers will face 
unexpected hardships, it follows that as the likelihood of adoption increases so does the likelihood of the issuance of 
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Producers with a∈[ 0, aNA) will prefer not to adopt conservation practices, while producers with a∈ (aNA, 1] 
find it more profitable to participate in the program and adopt conservation practices on their highly 
erodible land. As mentioned previously, when producers are uniformly distributed with respect the 
differentiating attribute a, aNA also gives the portion of farmers that do not adopt conservation practices, 
sNA. 
  The portion of farmers who decide not to adopt conservation practices but masquerade as 
adopters in order to receive the government payments, 
c
NA s , is determined by the intersection of the 
c
NA Π  
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Comparative statics results can easily be drawn from this model. More specifically, an increase in 
the government payments linked to conservation practices increases the benefits from noncompliant 
behavior (i.e., shifts the 
c
















). In addition, this increase in government payments raises the returns to adoption of 
conservation practices (i.e., shifts the Π A curve upwards) and increases the number of farmers that 












). Obviously, since the increase in 
government payments increases both 
c
NA s  and sA, it reduces the portion of honest non adopters (i.e., 




NA s s s − = , by an equal amount.   10 
Similarly, an increase in (any of) the enforcement parameters (i.e., audit probability and 
penalties) increases the expected penalty for noncompliant behavior (i.e., shifts the 
c
NA Π  curve 
















). Noncompliance will be completely deterred when the expected penalty exceeds the 
government payments linked to the adoption of conservation practices for all producers (i.e., when the 
curve 
c
NA Π  lies underneath curve Π NA ∀ a).  
On the other hand, if the level of enforcement is such that δ 0ρ  ≤  (δ 0ρ )
+  all farmers that do not 
adopt conservation practices will find it optimal to masquerade as adopters and claim the government 
payments (i.e., the Π NA curve lies underneath 
c
NA Π  and/or Π A curves ∀ a and the share of honest non 
adopters,
h
NA s , falls to zero (Figure 4)).  
Not only does reduced enforcement increase the share of non-adopters that masquerade as 
adopters, it also provides economic incentives that turn previous adopters of conservation practices to 
noncompliance. Specifically, when enforcement is relatively low (i.e., when δ 0ρ  < (δ 0ρ )
+ ) producers with 
a∈ (aNA, 
' c
NA a ] find it optimal not to comply with the provisions of the program (see Figure 4). In this case, 
the portion of farmers in noncompliance increases to: 
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Obviously, the lower is the level of enforcement, the greater is the extent of noncompliance, and the lower 
is the portion of farmers that adopt conservation practices. Adoption of conservation practices also falls 
with an increase in the cost of adoption, i.e., the greater is the cost of adopting conservation practices, the 
lower is the level of conservation compliance.   11 
The results on farmer noncompliance with the provisions of the conservation program on highly 
erodible lands can be summarized in the following three propositions: 
 
Proposition 1:  For farmer noncompliance to be completely deterred, the expected penalty should exceed 
the government payments linked to the adoption of conservation practices.  
 
Proposition 2:  The extent of noncompliance increases with the size of government payments and the 
costs of adopting conservation practices and falls with an increase in the level of 
enforcement (i.e., an increase in audit frequency and/or the penalties associated with 
detected noncompliance).  
 
Proposition 3:  A lax enforcement of the conservation program will increase the number of farmers that 
do not comply with the provisions of the program – it will increase the number of non-
adopters that claim eligibility to government payments and it might also induce adopters 
of conservation practices to turn to noncompliance.   
 
 
3.   The Government Problem – Enforcement of Conservation Compliance  
The analysis in the previous section suggests that the individual producer’s decision to not comply with 
the provisions of the conservation program on highly erodible lands as well as the extent of 
noncompliance depend on the amount of government payments linked to conservation behavior, GP, the 
audit probability, δ , and the penalties for detected noncompliance, ρ . Since both the policy variable GP 
and the enforcement parameters δ  and ρ  are endogenous to the government at large, the question that 
naturally arises is “why does farmer noncompliance occur?”  
Even though the size of farm program payments is exogenous to the agency responsible for 
conservation programs,
3 Proposition 1 indicates that producer noncompliance can be completely deterred 
when the expected costs associated with noncompliant behavior exceed the benefits of noncompliance 
(i.e., the government payments). Thus, with government payments being exogenous, all that is required 
for noncompliance to be completely deterred is a level of audits and penalties to ensure that: 
                                                 
3 The level of farm program payments is determined by the Congress. In the case of the conservation program on 
highly erodible lands, conservation compliance is determined by the USDA Natural Resource Conservation Service, 
while the USDA Farm Service Agency is responsible for determining farmer eligibility for government payments 
(GAO).   12 
() ()a GP a ≥ ρ δ  
 
In this case, the expected costs outweigh the benefits of noncompliance (the 
c
NA Π  curve lies underneath 
Π NA and/or Π A curves ∀ a) and noncompliant behavior is effectively deterred. 
Interestingly, since both audits and penalties are inversely related to the amount of 















), when the establishment of penalties is costless, policy 
enforcers can achieve the (any) desired level of enforcement by substituting costly monitoring with 
costless fines. This trade-off reduces the enforcement costs of the program and maintains conservation 




ρ ≥ . At the limit, enforcement of conservation compliance can be costless 
through the imposition of enormous (infinite) fines and no monitoring (Becker’s “optimal fine” result).  
While economically efficient, this enforcement policy is not particularly appealing, however. 
Infinite penalties (the government taking over the farmer’s assets? life in prison? decapitation?) for 
farmers who dot adopt conservation practices yet claim farm program payments (that prior to the 
enactment of the conservation program would receive anyway) are neither feasible nor costless or just. 
The imposition of disproportionate fines would likely offend the public sense of justice – “the punishment 
does not fit the crime” (Carr-Hill and Stern; Stern; Stigler; Shavell; Cowell). 
This line of reasoning might explain the existing limit on the penalties for farmers found not 
complying with the conservation program on highly erodible lands. The penalty for detected 
noncompliance equals the government payments, i.e., producers who are found to be noncompliant lose 
their government payments. While this might seem like a “fair” enforcement policy since “the 
punishment fits the crime” (“exactly” we would add), it is not fully effective as far as enforcement of 
compliance is concerned. The reason is that, unless every single producer is investigated (i.e., unless δ   = 
1 for all producers), when the penalty equals the government payments (i.e., when ρ  = GP(a)), the 
benefits from noncompliant behavior exceed the expected costs (i.e., δ (a)ρ  < GP(a)), and there will   13 
always be economic incentives for noncompliance (the relevant net returns curve 
c
NA Π  will lie above the 
Π NA and Π A curves over some range of a and 
c
NA s  will be positive). 
The question then becomes “how extensive will this noncompliance be?” Substituting GP(a) forρ  
and repeating the analysis in Section 2.2 shows that when penalties equal government payments the extent 
of noncompliance depends on the audit probability. While a value of δ (a) = 1 would eliminate any 
economic incentive for noncompliance, investigating every producer would entail a massive disbursement 
of resources that would most likely violate the budget constraint of any governmental agency.
4   
Presuming that the objective of the agency responsible for the enforcement of conservation 
compliance is deterrence of farmer noncompliance, when ρ  = GP(a), the optimal audit frequency will be 
determined by the resource costs of monitoring producers and the available budget to program enforcers. 
Specifically, the optimal number of audits falls with an increase in the resource costs of monitoring 
farmer compliance and/or a reduction in the available budget. The lower is the audit frequency, the lower 
is the expected cost of noncompliant behavior, and the greater is the extent of noncompliance. When the 


























farmers will find it optimal to not comply with the program (the relevant 
c
NA Π  curve lies above curve Π A 
∀ a) and adoption of conservation practices falls to zero (sA = 0).  
 
Proposition 4:  Government payments have both a direct and an indirect effect on farmer noncompliance 
with the provisions of the conservation program on highly erodible lands. Specifically, an 
increase in government payments increases the economic incentives for noncompliance 
by increasing the benefits associated with it (direct effect). At the same time, the increase 
in government payments reduces the incentives to not comply by increasing the expected 
penalty for noncompliance (indirect effect). Given, however, that penalties are weighted 
by the audit probability (which is less than one) when expected costs are calculated, the 
direct effect of government payments on producer behavior dominates, i.e., an increase in 
government payments will increase both benefits and expected costs to noncompliance 
                                                 
4 At the end of the day, even if these resources were available, it is most likely that the government would find it 
optimal to devote them to the deterrence of more socially harmful criminal offenses than farmers masquerading as 
adopters of conservation practices to receive government payments.    14 
but it will increase the benefits by relatively more. The difference in the magnitude of 
these changes is determined by the size of the audit probability. The lower is the audit 
probability, the greater are the net expected gains from noncompliant behavior, and the 
greater the extent of noncompliance is expected to be.  
 
Given that the audit probability is less than one for most producers and the equality of penalties 
with government payments, a message of the theoretical model developed in this paper is that the lack of 
full compliance with the provisions of the conservation program should come as no surprise.  
 
Proposition 5:  Unless the government increases the fines associated with fraudulent (noncompliant) 
behavior over and above the farm program payments, enforcement of conservation 
compliance will remain imperfect and farmer noncompliance with the provisions of the 
program on highly erodible lands will continue to persist.  
 
These results are supported by the empirical analysis in the following section.    
 
4.   Empirical Application  
In this section we test the hypotheses derived above. To conduct the empirical analysis we rely on state 
level data from the USDA Farm Service Agency 1997 Status Review Results (SRR) as well as on data 
from the USDA 1997 Agricultural and Resource Management Survey (ARMS). Due to issues of 
confidentiality, observations on individual behavior are not available. The SRR provides audit data 
including incidence of noncompliance, enforcement effort, number of audits and variances issued. The 
ARMS data provides data on farm program participation and payments. According to the SRR data, 
approximately 50,000 farmers were audited in 1997 and over 48,000 were found to be actively applying 
an approved conservation plan.  From the ARMS data we see that roughly 750,000 farmers received 
government payments during that year totaling nearly $6 billion. 
The audit data groups the observations on individual behavior to the state level. That is, we 
observe in the data the number of audited individuals who choose to comply or not. Fortunately, this 
organization of the data allows us to test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model of this paper. 
Additionally, in certain states the statistical weighting procedure used at USDA to estimate state level   15 
statistics required that certain states be aggregated to insure reliable estimates (see Dubman, p.14). Table 
1 provides a listing of those states that were aggregated. The region-specific cost of conservation 
compliance estimates provided in Barbarika and Dicks are used to explain some of the variation in 
noncompliance across states (see Table 2). Although these conservation cost were estimated prior to 
implementation of the conservation program on highly erodible land, they still provide relative cost 
differences across regions that can act as a proxy for current differences in the cost of adopting 
conservation practices.  Overall, the data set is limited to 34 observations.  
  Two empirical models are estimated. The first model is the enforcement decision model, which is 
based on the theoretical framework developed earlier, and can be expressed as:  
 
i 3 i 2 i 1 i ε α α α δ + + + = penalty var effort  
 
where the audit probability (δ ) depends upon the enforcement effort (effort), which is measured as the 
number of hours spent conducting audits, the number of variances issued (var) and the penalties for 
noncompliance. The subscript i denotes the ith state while  i ε  are identical and independently distributed 
error terms. The variance term is problematic in that the variances issued in the previous year determine 
the current year’s audit probability and the only available variances are for the same year as the audit 
probability. In light of this situation we also estimate a variant of this model excluding the variance term. 
The second model is the noncompliance decision model, which follows from the theoretical 
findings, and can be written as: 
 
i i 2 i i 1 o i b 1 [ b b nc % υ δ + + − + = concost ]payment  
 
This model captures the relationship between the share of farmers who decide to not comply (%nc) with 
the regional cost of conservation compliance (concost) and the net benefits from government payments 
(payment). The latter corresponds to the program payments less the expected penalty for noncompliance   16 
(the product of payments withheld and the audit probability), or simply [1-δ ] payment.  i υ  are identical 
and independently distributed error terms. To avoid issues of multicollinearity and endogeneity we 
substitute the estimated enforcement model for δ  in the noncompliance decision model. Given that we 
have two sets of estimates for the enforcement model, we estimate the noncompliance decision model for 
each of the estimated audit probability models. 
A grouped data maximum likelihood function is used to estimate these models. The likelihood 
function is written as: 
  
))] x ( F 1 ln( ) P 1 ( ) x ( F ln P [ n L ln i i i i
i
i Γ Γ ′ − − + ′ = ∑  
 
where ni is a weight that typically represents the sample population in location i (Greene, p. 654), Pi is the 
proportional dependent variable, F is the normal probability distribution and  b , α Γ =  for the 
enforcement and noncompliance models, respectively.  
In the case of the enforcement decision model, the dependent variable (Pi) is the audit probability, 
which is derived by dividing the number of audits in a state by the total number of farms receiving 
payments. The number of farms receiving payments in a state is used as the weight in the likelihood 
function employed in the enforcement decision model estimation. In the noncompliance decision model, 
the dependent variable is the rate of noncompliance that is derived by dividing the total number of 
farmers not complying with the provisions of the conservation program by the total number of audited 
farms. In this situation, it is the number of audits for each state that is used as the weight in the likelihood 
function. 
  The estimation of the enforcement decision model allows us to test three hypotheses. First, does 
the budget constraint bind so that the enforcement agency must trade-off enforcement cost with the total 
number of audits (i.e., the more effort (time) required in auditing a producer, the more costly is the audit 
and the lower is the audit probability),  0 1 < α ? Second, is the audit probability lower in those states with   17 
larger government payments (penalties),  0 2 < α ? This hypothesis addresses the inverse relationship 
between costly monitoring and costless fines described in Section 3. Third, is the audit probability higher 
in those states with greater numbers of issued variances,  0 3 > α ? This hypothesis tests the claim that the 
issuance of a variance increases the probability of an audit by program enforcers. 
In the noncompliance decision model, two additional hypotheses can be tested. First, is the rate of 
noncompliance higher in those states with greater net benefits from noncompliant behavior,  0 b1 > ? This 
hypothesis test allows us to verify the findings stated in Propositions 2 and 4. Second, is the rate of 
noncompliance higher in those states with higher costs of conservation compliance,  0 b2 > ? This 
hypothesis test is based on the derived theoretical result stated in Proposition 2. 
  Tables 3 and 4 list the estimation results. The data supports the implications of the theoretical 
model since all the hypothesized coefficients are consistent in sign with the theoretical results and 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level of significance. Specifically, the empirical analysis shows that 
the audit probability increases with the number of variances issued and falls with an increase in the cost 
per audit and the size of the penalty. The empirical relationship between audit frequency and variances 
issued should be treated carefully however, given the earlier caveat. In addition, the empirical results 
support the theoretical findings that the incidence of noncompliance is an increasing function of 
government payments. Finally, the empirical analysis verifies the contention that the extent of 
noncompliance increases with the cost associated with the adoption of conservation practices. 
 
5.   Summary and Concluding Remarks  
The introduction of the USDA program on highly erodible lands purports to induce producers/owners of 
highly erodible land to adopt conservation practices when employing this land in their production process. 
To provide producers with incentives to adopt (costly) conservation practices, the government has linked 
participation in the program with individual producer’s eligibility to receiving farm program payments.    18 
While the linkage of government payments to conservation activities induces adoption of 
conservation practices, it also creates economic incentives for some producers to develop the plan of 
action required for the receipt of government payments, but to not actually comply with the terms of the 
policy (i.e., to not adopt the required conservation practices).  
Theoretical and empirical results suggest that both the producers’ decision to not comply as well 
as the extent of noncompliance depend on the size of government payments linked to farmer participation 
in the program, the costs associated with the adoption of conservation activities, and the enforcement 
policy of the government. Specifically, the greater is the size of government payments and/or the higher 
are the costs of adopting conservation practices, the greater are the economic incentives for, and the 
extent of, noncompliance. Put in a different way, while an increase in government payments will increase 
adoption of conservation practices it will also increase the number of producers who do not adopt 
conservation practices yet claim government payments they are not entitled to. The number of producers 
who do not comply with the provisions of conservation practices also increases with a reduction in the 
probability that noncompliant behavior will be detected and with a decrease in the penalties for detected 
noncompliance. When the level of enforcement becomes relatively low, there are also economic 
incentives for farmers that have previously adopted conservation practices to switch to noncompliance. 
For noncompliance to be completely deterred, the combination of enforcement parameters (i.e., 
audit probability and penalties) should be such that the expected penalty exceeds the benefits from 
noncompliant behavior (i.e., the government payments linked to conservation behavior) for all producers. 
Any enforcement policy that fails to meet this criterion will fail in achieving full compliance.  
The government enforcement policy on highly erodible lands certainly falls into this category. 
What makes the government policy ineffective in completely deterring noncompliance is the fact that 
penalties for detected noncompliant behavior equal the benefits, i.e., producers who are audited and found 
to be noncompliant with the conservation program lose their government payments. Given that penalties 
are weighted by the audit probability when expected costs to noncompliance are calculated, the expected   19 
costs do not exceed the benefits creating economic incentives for some producers to not comply with the 
provisions of the conservation program on highly erodible land. 
With penalties set equal to benefits from noncompliant behavior, the net producer gains from, and 
the extent of, noncompliance on highly erodible lands depend on the audit probability which, in turn, is 
determined by the resource costs of monitoring farmer compliance and the available budget to program 
enforcers. Specifically, the greater are the monitoring costs and/or the lower are the resources available to 
program enforcers, the lower the audit probability is expected to be. And the lower is the audit frequency, 
the greater is the extent of noncompliance. 
In this context, given the relatively low audit probability faced by producers/owners of highly 
erodible land, the incidence of producer noncompliance with the provisions of the conservation program 
should come as no surprise. A message of this paper is that unless the government (Congress) changes its 
policy to increase the fines associated with fraudulent behavior over and above the farm program 
payments, enforcement of conservation compliance will remain imperfect and some degree of farmer 
noncompliance with the provisions of the program on highly erodible lands will continue to persist.   20 
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Figure 2.    Production decisions and participation in the conservation program   
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Figure 4.    Production and compliance decisions when δ 0ρ  ≤  (δ 0ρ )
+  
0   1  
Differentiating Producer Attribute (a)  
Net Returns  
γ +θ   
β   











0   1  
Differentiating Producer Attribute (a)  






NA a NA a
c
NA Π
















NA GP ) Q ( c pQ − + −
















NA GP ) Q ( c pQ − + −








A GP ) Q ( c pQ + −
NA s  23 
 






New England  CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT 
Mid-Atlantic  DE,MD,NJ,WV 
Delta  AR,LA 
Southeast  FL,GA 
Mountain  CO,WY 
 
 
Table 2.   Regional Cost of Conservation Compliance 
Region Average  Cost/Acre 
Northeast  2.206977 
Appalachia  1.05119 
Southeast  1.142759 
Delta  0.848039 
Corn Belt  0.243977 
Lake States  0.241617 
Northern Plains  0.129595 
Southern Plains  0.318854 
Mountain  0.182493 
Pacific  0.791463 
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Table 3.   Estimation Results for Enforcement Decision Model 


























** 0.001 significance level, z-statistic in parenthesis. 
 
 
Table 4.   Estimation Results for the Noncompliance Decision Model 
























* 0.002 significance level 
Note: the third column labeled b
nv presents the estimated 
coefficients when the estimated enforcement decision 
model without a variance term is used. 
 
 
 